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circumstances had occurred. The trial court must makefindingson all material issues;
failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476,478
(Utah App. 1988). The determination of the trial court's determination that there [has or
has not] been a substantial material change in circumstances is presumed valid and review
under the abuse of discretion standard. Diener v. Diener, 98 P.3d, 1178, 508 (Utah APP.
2004).
2)

Whether the court erred in itsfindingthat the Appellee has not

misrepresented her income at the time of the mediation and enforced agreement of
2003? The Appellant filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce in April of 2005
claiming that there had been a substantial material change in circumstances concerning an
increase in the Appellee's income using the criteria outlined in 78-45-7.2 (9)(c)(iii)
"material change of 30% or more in the income of a parent". The court failed to make a
finding regarding the claim in the Petition to Modify. A claim of misrepresentation
(fraud) is a tort and thus is not properly addressed in a Petition to Modify a Decree of
Divorce. Bayles v. Bayles, 981 P.2d 403 (Utah App., 1999). The trial court must make
findings on all material issues; failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Andersen v.
Andersen, 757 P.2d 476,478 (Utah App., 1988).
3)

Whether the court'sfindingthat the Appellant is "Voluntarily

Underemployed95 is erroneous and an abuse of discretion? The trial court'sfindingsof
fact in a divorce action are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Kessimakis v.
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Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226, 1228 (Utah App., 1999). The trial court, however, must have
made adequately detailed finding on each issue so that the Court of Appeals can
determine if those findings were rationally based upon applicable factors. Williamson v.
Williamson, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 45,46 (Utah App. 1999). The trial court must make
findings on all material issues; failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Andersen v.
Andersen, 757 P.2d 476,478 (Utah App., 1988).
4)

Whether the court abused its discretion in its enforcement of a private

school expenses? The Utah Court of Appeals has held that private school is an
unreasonable luxury expense. Starley v. McDowell, Not reported in p.2d, 1999 WL
33244801 (Utah App., 1999). The higher court has also held that private school costs are
part and parcel of a child support award and have found no authority to the contrary.
Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955(Utah App., 1994). The court's finding that mandates the
payment of private school is not supported by law nor any legal authority constituting an
abuse of discretion.
5)

Whether the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to

the Appellee on the basis that there was no merit to the Appellant's claims? The
court has the responsibility to make findings on whether the fees for an attorney are
reasonable, whether the Appellant is capable of paying, and whether the Appellee is in
need of assistance in paying her attorney's fees. The trial court must makefindingson all
material issues; failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Andersen v. Andersen, 757
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P.2d 476,478 (Utah App., 1988). The trial court also based the award on the finding that
'there were no merit to the claims of the Appellant in seeking a modification. The trial
court must make findings on all material issues; failure to do so constitutes reversible
error. Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476,478 (Utah App., 1988).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal
(9) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the court to adjust
the amount of a child support order if there has been a substantial change in
circumstances.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (9)(a), a substantial change in circumstances may include:
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent;
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn;
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (9)(a), the court shall, taking into account
the best interests of the child, determine whether a substantial change has occurred. If it
has, the court shall then determine whether the change results in a difference of 15% or
more between the amount of child support ordered and the amount that would be required
under the guidelines. If there is such a difference and the difference is not of a temporary
nature, the court shall adjust the amount of child support ordered to that which is provided
for in the guidelines.
78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used.
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of the base
combined child support obligation.
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78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes prospective income
(4) (a) Gross incomefromself-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated
by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation
from gross receipts.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then
recalculated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall provide
year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and complete copies of tax returns from at
least the most recent year unless the court finds the verification is not reasonably available.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an
underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount
imputed, the party defaults, or, in contested cases, a hearing is held and afindingmade
that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment
potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications,
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community, or the
median earning for persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area as
found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations.
(1) Each parent's child support obligation shall be established in proportion to their
adjusted gross incomes
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78-4S-7.9, Joint physical custody — Obligation calculations.
In cases ofjoint physical custody, the base child support award shall be determined as follows:
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine the base combined
child support obligation using the base combined child support obligation table.
(2) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined child support
obligation by multiplying the base combined child support obligation by each parent's
percentage of combined adjusted gross income. The amounts so calculated are the base
child support obligation due from each parent for support of the children.
78-45-7.14. Base combined child support obligation table and low income table.
The following includes the Base Combined Child Support Obligation Table:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves a Petition to Modify a Decree of Divorce filed by the
Appellant in April of 2005. The basis for the request for modification was a substantial
material change in circumstance through the standard of Utah Code Annotated 78-457.2 (9).
Therefore this case involves the:
1) the threshold and mathematical determination of a substantial material change in
circumstances that was not foreseen at the Time the Decree of Divorce was entered or the
modification of 2003 was adopted.
2)findingsnecessary on all material issues.
3) findings necessary to support the legal conclusion of voluntary underemployment.
4) the assignment of correct adjusted gross income to both parties and the correct
-6-

calculation of an amount for child support.
5) private school for a minor child.
6) an award of attorney's fees.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
The parties were granted a Decree of Divorce in December of 1998.
The Appellee filed a Petition to Modify in April of 2003 which was settled in
mediation held in September of 2003. The Appellee was granted a Motion to Compel for
the "Memorandum of Understanding" in June of 2004.
The Appellant filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce in April of 2005 as
stated above. The matter came before the District Court on June 26,2006 with the trail
court issuing a Bench Ruling through a "Memorandum and Order" on July 11,2006. An
Memorandum and Objection to Order and Motion to Alter or Amend Memorandum was
filed by the Appellant on or about July 18, 2006 which was overruled by the trial court.
This Appeal is taken from the Final Judgement of the Second District Court for
Weber County, State of Utah, entered by Judge Roger S. Dutson, with the signing of the
Order Denying Petitioner's Petition To Modify Decree of Divorce on the 31st day of
August, 2006.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
On complete of the day at trial (June 26, 2006), the trial court elected to give a
bench ruling and closed for the day. On July 11,2006 approximately two weeks later, the
trial court enter its findings by Memorandum and Order on July 11,2006.
The trial court found that the Appellant had failed to meet his burden of proof on
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all issues contained in his Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce.
The trial court found that the Appellant's claimed income of $3,500.00 per month
are inaccurate and are not credible as he had bank deposits of $226,132.02 in 2004 and
$174,652.33 from April to July of 2005.
The trial court found that there has not been a substantial material change in
circumstances justifying a modification of the existing orders in this case and that the
Appellant had no reasonable factual or legal basis to pursue the requested modification.
The trial court found that the Appellant was "voluntarily underemployed" stating
in various findings that: the earning capacity of the Appellant has not changed form the
time of mediation (September, 2003), the Appellant has had the opportunity and jobs to
increase his income and is subsequently voluntarily underemployed, the Appellant has
diverted his earning ability to unjustifiable non-income producing activities, the Appellant
has had employment or opportunity of employment which would provide him with similar
or increased income as establish in the proceedings in 2003, the Appellant has chosen
recently to return to school voluntarily reducing his income, and the court has considered
the possibility of the Appellant being required to move elsewhere in reaching the
conclusion of'Voluntary underemployment".
The court found that the Appellant has remained an important part of the parties
child's life and should be commended for that and that the court anticipates that the
Appellee will continue to insure the more than normal contact between the Appellant and
the minor child.
The court found that the Appellee has not misrepresented her income in the
establishment of the original child support order of 2003.
The court ordered a continuation of parties to continue payment for private school
for the parties minor child through stipulation and order of the previous court as no
-8-

change was warranted.
The court ordered that a reduced amount of the Appellee's attorneys fees were to
be paid by the Appellant on the basis that the reduced amount was reasonable, the court
believed that the Appellant was capable of paying them, and there being no merit to the
Appellant's claims.

RELEVANT FACTS
1) Appellant and Appellee were married on June 10,1988.
2) The parties had one child born during the marriage on July 19, 1996.
3) Appellant and Appellee were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce on
December 3,1998.
4) The parties Decree of Divorce stated that neither party were to pay child
based on equal Joint Custody of the minor child and equal incomes of

support

the parties.

5) The Appellant had a second minor child born in a subsequent marriage on April 9,
2001.
6) The Appellee filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce in April of 2003.
7) The parties established a "Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)" in a mediation
session on September 22, 2003 which was signed by both parties and their attorneys
which established an amount of child support for the Appellant to pay the Appellee based
on incomes asserted by both parties.
8) The Appellant requested information verification on income and other requests for
changes to the MOU in a correspondence to the Appellee on September 27,2003 to
which the Appellee refused to re-mediate as provided within the MOU and refused to
address any of the requests for changes.
-9-

9) The matter of the MOU was settled by the trial court through a motion to compel filed
by the Appellee through the District Court in June of 2004.
10) The Appellant filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce in April of 2005
based on a substantial material change in circumstances claimingfirst,that the Appellee
has had a significant increase in the income since the establishment of the MOU and
second, that the Appellant has had a significant decrease in the income since the
establishment of the MOU.
11) The Appellant's Petition to Modify came before the trial court on June 26,2006
where the afore mentioned "Disposition at Trial Court" was given through a bench ruling
on July 11,2006 and subsequent Order Denying Petitioner's Petition to Modify Decree of
Divorce signed on August 31, 2006.
12) The Appellant filed a timely appeal based upon those findings. Requested transcripts
of the trial held on June 26, 2006 are not available do to an equipment malfunction in the
court causing much of the proceeding to be inaudible.
13) The Appellant is current on all child support payments which have been paid each
month in the month for which they were due since the child support order was established
in 2003 without state or court intervention.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Legislature has established statutory directives which provide the
method, means and threshold by which the trial court is to address a dispute. This case
primarily functions on those clear statutory directives. Should the trial court fail to follow
the directives within the Statutes, it would render them superfluous and inoperative.
Established case law provides support to the adherence to the directives provided within
the statutes which provides a standard by which all citizens can expect justice and fair
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treatment.
The issues of the showing of the threshold of a substantial material change in
circumstances, the establishment of the adjusted gross incomes of the parties for the
calculation of child support, the finding of a party to be "voluntary underemployed", and
an award of attorney's fees are plainly stated within the directives contained within the
statutes. The court abuses its discretion when it fails to comply with the requirements of
law, fails to make the directed findings of fact in order to support its decision, or fails to
make findings on all material issues.
The trial court has no legal authority or basis to order the parties to enroll the
minor child in private school and share the expenses of private school tuition. There is no
statutory directive regarding this issue and established case law supports the position of
the Appellant.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point 1:
Did the Appellant provide the information required by statute necessary in establishing
the threshold of a substantial material change in circumstances has occurred and that the
change was not contemplated at the time the decree was entered or at the time of the 2003
modification? If so. did the trial court abuse its discretion in not following the
requirements of law?
Marshaling Requirement:
1) The Appellant has shown an average monthly income prior to the alleged
substantial material change in circumstance that greatly exceeds the claimed
amount brought forth in the evidence at trial. These past monthly averages since
1998, demonstrate his earning capacity.
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2) The Appellant has voluntarily returned to school pursuing a Master's Degree
which shows that he is not putting full effort into his earning capacity.
3) The Appellant, through written communication, told the Appellee that "his job
has changed and there is nothing he could do about in unless he moved to
Chicago". Therefore it assumable that he had an opportunity to move to Chicago in
order to keep his job from changing.
4) The Appellant had bank deposits of $226,132.02 in 2004 and $174,652.33 from
April to July of 2005. These deposit amounts are to the contrary to the $3,500.00
per month that the Appellant claims as income.
5) The Appellant bought a townhouse in July of 2005 that is located in the Chicago
area. The mortgage application for the property, which was signed by the
Appellant, stated that his current income was equal to the amount he was earning
prior to the alleged change income claimed as of April 1, 2005.
Appellant's Argument Point 1:
The arguments of the Appellee are focus primarily on assumptions, the
circumstances of the Appellant's past, or the inertia from the past. The statutes governing
this issue are driven by forward looking statements such as "perspective income",
"potential employment" and "probable earnings". Past gross earnings do not show
"potential employment" or future earning capacity as industries change, markets mature,
and technology advances nor does it take into account business expenses that are
deducted according to state law. Past deposits do not show "perspective income" as
finances can be obtained through non-income sources such as mortgages and small
business loans. The averaging of income does not show current status of income, but
distorts it by incorporating the past. State law 78-45-5 (5)(a) states that: "When possible,
gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then recalculated to
-12-

determine the average gross monthly income." If gross income is averaged based on the
amounts of gross incomefromthe time prior to the point in time when the change in
circumstances occurred, a true and factual picture cannot be attained. The amount from
the averages shown as "earnings capacity" do not show adjusted gross earning as required
by statute.
The Appellant's Petition to Modify was brought before the trial court on the basis
of a substantial material change in circumstances. The Appellant has the burden to show
that there was not only a material change in circumstances, but that the change was in fact
substantial as well as the change in circumstances was not contemplated at the time the
decree was entered and in the instant case, the time the "Memorandum of Understanding"
was adopted.
The criteria for the determination of whether the threshold of a change in
circumstances is deemed substantial is provided by statute U.C.A78-45-7.2 stating (9) (a)
A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the court to adjust the
amount of a child support order if there has been a substantial change in
circumstances.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (9)(a), a substantial change in circumstances may include:
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent;
((c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (9)(a), the court shall, taking into account
the best interests of the child, determine whether a substantial change has occurred. If it
has, the court shall then determine whether the change results in a difference of 15% or
more between the amount of child support ordered and the amount that would be required
under the guidelines. If there is such a difference and the difference is not of a temporary
nature, the court shall adjust the amount of child support ordered to that which is provided
•13-

for in the guidelines.
The criteria in the determination of a substantial material change in circumstances
is also well supported in established case law. (Diener v. Diener, 98 P.3d, 1178, 508 Ut
App 2004).
The information dictated by statute needed for the calculation of the directed
findings in a Petition to Modify a Decree of Divorce are obtained using:
U.C.A 78-45-7.2 (2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a
rebuttal presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or
permanent child support (emphasis added).
U.CA. 78-45-7.5 (5) (b) "Each parent shall provide verification of current
income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements
and complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year...".
U.CA. 78-45-7.5 (4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a
business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for selfemployment or business operation from gross receipts (emphasis added).
U.CA. 78-45-7.9 Joint physical custody — Obligation calculations.
In cases of joint physical custody, the base child support award shall be
determined as follows:
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine the base
combined child support obligation using the base combined child support
obligation table.
(2) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined child support
obligation by multiplying the base combined child support obligation by each
parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income. The amounts so calculated
-14-

are the base child support obligation duefromeach parent for support of the children.
(3) If the obligor's time with the children exceeds 110 overnights, the obligation
shall be calculated further as follows:
(a) if the amount of time to be spent with the children is between 110 and 131
overnights, multiply the number of overnights over 110 by .0027, then multiply the
result by the base combined child support obligation, and then subtract the result
from the obligor's payment as determined by Subsection (2) to arrive at the
obligor's payment.
Several of the Appellant's earnings statements (year-to-date pay stubs) as well as a
summary were admitted into evidence under (tr. P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 14 p. 1-7)
detailing a 60% decrease in gross income beginning with the two week pay period ending
on April 10,2005 to a salaried amount of $2692.31 or $5,833.33 per month (tr. P-l,
Petitioner's Exhibit 14 p. 4).
The Appellee's income taxes for 2004 and 2005, the two years following the
establishment of the child support order were admitted into evidence under (tr. P-l,
Petitioner's Exhibit 19, p. 1-6). This admitted evidence from statute directed means show
the Appellee to have a personal annual income of $82,935.00 in 2004 (tr. P-l, Petitioner's
Exhibit 19, p. 5, line 22) and $73,405.00 in 2005 (tr. P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 19, p. 3,
line 22).
The baseline for the comparison for a substantial material change in circumstance
was admitted into evidence in the form of the Child Support Worksheet calculating the
child support order of 2003 in (tr. P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 3) and the Parties' 2003
-15-

agreement titled "Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU) (tr. P-1, #2, p. 7, para. #10).
As stated in the MOU and the child support worksheet, the 2003 incomes of the parties
were established at $2,000.00 per month for the Appellee and $16,700.00 for the
Appellant.
Both the Appellee, who is self-employed, and the Appellant, who is employed and
responsible for his own business expenses, are entitled to deduct necessary those
expenses as stated in statute 78-45-7.5 (4) (a). The 2004 and 2005 personal annual
incomes of the Appellee are in fact "adjusted gross incomes" as necessary business
expenses were deducted on her business tax returns (tr. P-1, Petitoner's Exhibit 19). The
Appellant had evidence admitted showing a history of necessary business expenses of
well in excess of $2,000.00 per month (tr. P-1, Petitioner's Exhibit 15).
Therefore using the mathematical precision detailed by U.C.A. 78-45-7.2 (9),
established case law of (Diener v. Diener, 98 P.3d, 1178, 508 Ut App 2004), and the
evidence admitted at trial in this case, the verifiable calculations are:
The Appellee's adjusted gross income has a sustained increased of over three
hundred percent (300%) from $2,000.00 per month to over $6,100.00 in 2005 and over
$6,900.00 per month in 2004 establishing a two year adjusted gross monthly income of
over $6,500.00.
The Appellant's adjusted gross has decreased seventy percent (70%)fromthe
amount established in 2003from$16,700.00 to $3,833.00 per month which is the monthly
gross income less necessary business expenses.
Using the statutory instructionfromU.C.A. 78-45-7.9 Joint Custody Calculation,
the child support amount to be paid by the Appellant is within one percent of the $258.92
calculated on the child support worksheet submitted to the trial court (tr. P-1, Petitioner's
-16-

Exhibit 22) using both parties adjusted gross income and allowing the income deduction
for the Appellant's other child born prior to the current child support order. The
prospective amount of child support is a reduction of 64%.
Statute directive states that a substantial material change in circumstances threshold
is a material change of 30% or more in the income of a parent and a result of a 15%
change in the child support amount. In the instant case the Appellant had an adjusted gross
income decrease of 70%, the Appellee had an adjusted gross income increase of 325%,
and the prospective child support amount would decrease by 64%. It is instructed by
Statute directive that the court SHALL adjust the amount of child support if these
conditions are met.
The only variable in the directive of the statute is that the court must take into
account "the best interests of the child". The court in fact looking at many factors
regarding the best interest of the child as stated in the findings that 'the Appellant has
remained an important part of the child's life and should be commended for that."
However, the court failed to enter any detailed findings regarding the best interests of the
child.
The court stated that 'the Appellant apparently has the notion that child support
guidelines must always control child support." The court continues on by stating that
"child expenses also generally continue to increase as children reach their teen years, even
though the tables do not reflect that fact." This finding by the court is in direct conflict
with the statutes and shows a direct disregard for the efforts of the legislature. The trial
court does not have the authority to bypass the requirements of law and abuses its
discretion in doing so.
The Appellant was able to show that this substantial material change in
circumstances was not contemplated at the time the decree was entered and the
modification (MOU) in 2003 as both documents were entered into evidence (Decree of
17

Divorce, tr. P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, and MOU tr. P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 2). There is
no provision in either document that addresses these issues at hand.
The Appellant has established with the higher court as was established with the
trial court, that through admitted evidence, all factors required by statutory directive for
the threshold of a substantial material change in circumstances were complete and were
not contemplated in established agreements. The trial court abuses its discretion when it
does not follow the requirement of law.
Point 2:
Whether the court erred in itsfindingthat the Appellee has not misrepresented her
income at the time of the mediation and enforced agreement of 2003?
Marshaling Requirement:
1) The Appellant filed an "Amended Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce"
claiming that the Appellee had misrepresented her income at the time of mediation
in September of 2003 and the enforcement of the "MOU' in June of 2004." The
Appellant failed in his burden of proof as no evidence was introduced that had any
showing of this allegation.
Argument of the Appellant Point 2:
The claim that the Appellee had misrepresented her income was made in an
"Amended Petition to Modify" filed by the Appellant after discovery. The trial court stated
in a ruling from a telephone conference that the Amended Petition to Modify would not be
heard by the court unless it was justified by the evidence. Evidence requested by the
Appellant was sent to the trial court for in camera review and was not release by the trial
18

court. Therefore no evidence was presented or admitted at the trial in pursuit of the
Amended Petition and accordingly the Petitioner's Amended Petition to Modify was not
heard by the Court.
The Appellant's Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce in April of 2005
claiming that there had been a substantial material change in circumstances concerning an
increase in the Appellee's income using the criteria outlined in 78-45-7.2 (9)(c)(iii)
"material change of 30% or more in the income of a parent". The court failed to make a
finding regarding the claim in the Petition to Modify. A claim of misrepresentation (fraud)
is a tort and thus is not properly addressed in a Petition to Modify a Decree of Divorce.
Bayles v. Bayles, 981 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1999). The trial court must make findings on
all material issues; failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Andersen v. Andersen, 757
P.2d 476,478 (Utah App. 1988). The trial court must have made adequate detailed finding
on each issue so that the Court of Appeals can determine if those findings were rationally
based upon applicable factors. Williamson v. Williamson, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 45,46
(Utah App. 1999).
Point 3:
Whether the court's finding that the Appellant is "Voluntarily
Underemployed" is erroneous and an abuse of discretion?
Marshaling Requirement:
1) The Appellant has sustained his employment for several years receiving
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compensation that exceeds the current amount claimed within his Petition to
Modify. Given his past earnings, it is highly unlikely that his earning capacity has
dropped to the level he has asked the court to adopted.
2) The Appellant has voluntarily returned to school which reducing his income.
3) The Appellant has had employment and the opportunity to employment that
would which provide him with similar or increased income. The Appellant may be
required to move elsewhere to obtain that employment and therefore should be
considered voluntarily underemployed.
Argument of Appellant Point 3:
The trial court'sfindingthat the Appellant is voluntarily underemployed must be
supported by subsequent findings. First the court must determine whether thefindingis in
fact voluntary, and secondly, that the Appellant is in fact underemployed.
The Appellant received a major reduction in his salary beginning the pay period
ending April 10,2005, however no change in employment (company or position) was
involved in the reduction (P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 14). The Appellee presented evidence
in the form of a letter (R-l, Respondent's Exhibit 5, para. 4 regarding child support
modification) that stated that the Appellant's job had changed unless he moved out of
state, but refused to do so as it would take him away from the minor child. The court took
this statement as an implication that the Appellant had an opportunity and jobs to increase
his income and stated that he is subsequently voluntarily underemployed.
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The trial court also allowed findings in the support of finding of voluntarily
underemployed in the form of the Appellant's demonstrated earning capacity. The court
also found that the Appellant had diverted his earning ability to unjustifiable non-income
producing activities by returning to school. The court also considered the possibility of his
being required to move elsewhere in reaching the conclusion of voluntary
underemployment.
The court's findings are not supported by evidence. The change in the Appellant's
compensation is a direct result of the change in compensation structure detailed through
evidence (P-l, Petitioner's exhibit 10). The evidence shows that the reduction was
mandated by the Appellant's employer which began on April 1, 2005. The court found that
the Appellant's return to school was a factor in reducing the Appellant's income, however
the reduction was effective April 1, 2005 as detailed in the contract (P-l, Petitioner's
Exhibit 10) and Appellant's pay stubs (P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 14) and the Appellant
began attending school in August of 2005 (Fall Semester) some three month after the
salary reduction as detailed by the Appellant's academic transcript (P-l, Petitioner's
Exhibit 24). The return to school would be more likely to be the result of a possible career
change resulting from a reduction in salary of the position the Appellant has held since
1197.
The court has no authority to require the Appellant to apply for employment which
would require him to move out of state. There was no evidence presented at trial that the
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Appellant has had opportunity and jobs to increase his income. The speculatory statement
from the Appellant to the Appellee that he would have to move to keep his job from
changing is not a statement of fact but nothing more than a hypothetical statement much
like a statement such as "I would be rich if I won the lottery".
There was no evidence presented at trial that the reduction of income of the
Appellant was voluntary. The Appellant is currently employed by the same company
holding the same position that he has held since 1997, however the payment structure has
changed several times in the ten years of employment. (See P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 14).
There was no evidence at trial that the Appellant had applied for employment nor evidence
that an offer/opportunity of employment was available to him. There was also no evidence
given at the trial that indicated the level of income for the Appellant in any market other
than his past earnings which do not indicate whether his change was due to an
overemployment situation or an underemployment situation. Therefore the trial court has
no basis for the finding that any underemployment is voluntary.
The second element of voluntary underemployment is the finding of
underemployment. U.C.A. 78-45-5 (5)(c) states that "Historical and current earnings shall
be used to determine whether an underemployment or overemployment situation exists."
In the determination of underemployment or overemployment, the court must establish a
baseline of comparison using statutory directive that instructs the court to use forward
looking statements such as prospective income (U.C.A. 78-45-5 (1)) for the determination
of gross income, and the employment potential and probable earnings for the imputation of
income (U.C.A. 78-45-5 (7). The court is required by this statute, to derive its conclusions
22

from: work history, occupational qualifications, and prevailing earnings of persons of
similar backgrounds within the community. The court's failure to follow statutory
directive gives it no baseline of comparison in its determination.
The court's use of nothing other than historical earnings and current earnings and
its determination that the Appellant underemployed just because he is earning less money
renders part of the statute superfluous and inoperative in that an overemployment situation
may have existed and the current earnings may be in line with the Appellant's work
history, occupational qualifications and prevailing earnings of persons of similar
backgrounds within the community. The court abuses its discretion when it merely states a
historical monthly income of a party and fails to adequately consider the party's probable
earnings or prospective income. Rehn v. Rehn, 974 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1999).
The trial court must formulate detailed subsidiaryfindsof fact which underlie a
finding of'Voluntary underemployment" for the purposes of imputing income to a party
for the purposes of determining child support. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App.
1993). The trial court'sfindingsof fact in a divorce action are reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard. Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226,1228 (Utah App. 1999).
The trial court must have made adequate detailedfindingon each issue so that the Court of
Appeals can determine if thosefindingswere rationally based upon applicable factors.
Williamson v. Williamson, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 46 (Utah App. 1999).
Point 4:
Whether the court abused its discretion in its enforcement of a private school
expenses?
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Marshaling Requirement:
1) The Appellant participated in mediation where a "Memorandum of
Understanding" was developed and signed by the parties and their attorneys. In this
agreement the Appellant agreed to pay one half of the tuition and expenses at
Christian Heritage School for the minor child. The Appellee maintains that there
has been no substantial material change in circumstances in this matter and
therefore no change should be made to the agreement.
Argument of Appellant Point 4:
The decision by the trial court on this issue removes all parental rightsfromthe
Appellant regarding where the minor child should attend school. The court also has forced
the Appellant to allocate funds to private schooling for the minor child when these funds
are needed elsewhere for more immediate issues such as the support of the Appellant's
family which includes an amount of child support that is paid in addition to the needs of
the minor child provided for by the Appellant at his home.
In Starley v. McDowell (Not Reported in P.2d, 1999 WL 33244801
Utah App.,1999), the trial court found that private schooling was an unreasonable luxury
expense with no evidence offered that public education would not adequately meet the
children's needs. This decision was affirmed by the higher court. In the instant case, no
evidence was presented that public school would not meet the needs of the child.
In Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955(Utah App. 1994), the Court of Appeals stated
"we believe private school costs are part and parcel of a child support award and have no
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authority to the contray". The court's finding that mandates the payment of private school
is not supported by law nor any legal authority constituting an abuse of discretion.
Point 5:
Whether the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the Appellee
on the basis that there was no merit to the Appellant's claims?
Marshaling Requirement:
1) The trial court awarded the Appellee attorney's based on its decision that there
was no merit to the Appellant's claims contained within his Petition to Modify.
2) The attorney for the Appellee stated that the attorney fees in this matter were
reasonable via affidavit.
3) The court believes that the Appellant is capable of paying the Appellee's
attorneys's fees.
Argument of Appellant Point 5:
The court failed to enter the necessary findings on the material issue that the
Appellee is in need of assistance in paying her attorney's fees. Failure to do so constitutes
reversible error. In addition, the court also based the award on that there was no merit to
the claims within the Appellant's Petition to Modify stating that the Appellant "has had no
reasonable factual or legal basis to pursue the requested modifications." The facts of this
matter as established through admitted evidence clearly meet the requirements as outlined
by statute in establishing a substantial material change in circumstances.
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The facts also show through admitted evidence that the Appellee is very capable of
paying her own attorney's fees as she has maintained an adjusted gross income of
$6,500.00 per month on average during the 2004 and 2005 tax years (P-l, Petitioner's
exhibit 19). The Appellee also has shown living expenses of $3,600.00 through a financial
declaration (P-l, Petitioner's Exhibit 4, pgs. 3-6). The trial court must makefindingson all
material issues; failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Andersen v. Andersen, 757
P.2d 476,478 (Utah App. 1988). The trial court must have made adequate detailed finding
on each issue so that the Court of Appeals can determine if thosefindingswere rationally
based upon applicable factors. Williamson v. Williamson, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 45,46
(Utah App. 1999).
CONCLUSION
The legislature understood that changes come to the lives of those that they govern.
The courts have been given an amount of discretion in handling the issues brought before
them. However, that amount of discretion is limited and abuses of the court's discretion is
defined within the statutes. This case shows a clear abuse of discretion in many areas as
the trial court cannot randomly chose with statutes to follow and which statutes to
disregard.
The legislature has provided statutory directives as a means for the trial court to
address the issues brought before it. The Court of Appeals the responsibility to review the
findings of the lower court in its adherence to those statutory directives whereby insuring
that justice is done regarding the people that the branches of our government so govern.
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The potential for injustice and the potentially devastating ramifications from the
failure of a court to adhere to the statutory directives not only may cause the destruction of
a family through unnecessary hardship of one party and the unjust enrichment of another
party, but it may cause the weakening of our society as our statutes act as pillars of
strength in the formation of that society.
The trial court made several errors in the instant case. The Utah Court of Appeals
has the opportunity and the responsibility to correct those errors and that the lower court,
while having a margin of discretion, cannot totally disregard the statutory directives
outlined by our legislature.
The Appellant would like to thank this court for its review of the issues which have
significant and long-lasting consequences on his life as well as the lives of his family
which continues to include the parties minor child.
The Appellant would also like to apologize for the time that this appeal and matter
has taken within the court system. However, the issues are very straight forward. They
have been calculated correctly and presented to both the trial court and the higher court
with systematic care and mathematical precision as detailed by statute.
Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Appellant respectfully requests that the
Order Denying Petitioner's Petition To Modify Decree of Divorce be reversed and the
issues therein be remanded to the proper authority for adherence to state law.
SIGNED AND DATED This 6th day of February, 2007.
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Alan D. Arnold, Petitioner/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of February, 2007, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, was delivered in person, to the following:

C. Richard Henriksen Jr.
Henriksen & Henriksen, P.C.
320 South 500 East
Salt lake City, Utah 84102
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ALAN ARNOLD

mv
MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

11im

Case No. 984901956
Honorable Roger S. Dutson

KARA H. ARNOLD
Defendant.

Petitioner Alan Arnold filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce in a divorce
action of December, 1998 and a later mediation, which was subsequently enforced by the court
on September 22,2003. Petitioner has claimed that his ex-wife misrepresented the amount of
money she was earning at the time of the 2003 agreement, that his earnings were substantially
less than at the time of the 2003 agreement, and that he has '...shouldered the major portion of
the care....'according to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines. He asked this court to reduce his
child support obligation, grant him the income tax deduction for the child, change the existing
medical, dental, vision and orthodontic insurance, and that visitation be changed.
The petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proof on all issues.
The court finds that Mr. Arnold is voluntarily underemployed and appears to have
diverted his earning ability to unjustifiable non-income producing activities. Financial support of
children is a primary obligation of the parents. The court does not find that Mrs. Arnold
misrepresented her income at the time of the mediation and enforced agreement of 2003. There
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Memorandum and Order
Arnold vs. Arnold
Case No. 984901956
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has not been a material and substantial change of circumstances justifying modification of the
existing orders in this case.
Mr. Arnold apparently has the notion that the child support guidelines must always
control child support awards. He had no reasonable factual or legal basis to pursue the requested
modifications herein. Child expenses also generally continue to increase as children reach their
teen years, even though the tables do not reflect that fact. This child will soon be 11 years old.
The court was very pleased with Mr. Arnold's history of remaining a very important part
of this child's life by giving substantially of his time and commitment to her well being, other
than his unwillingness to continue appropriate child support payments on her behalf. He should
be commended for the positive involvement he has with Alexa, as that is normally the greatest
problem this court encounters in this type case. That fact was also recognized in the trial by the
Respondent mother. The emotional well-being of a child in divorces weighs much greater than
the material things which were the primary subject of this hearing.
However, the court also recognizes that Mr. Arnold's continued substantial personal
involvement with Alexa should be a major consideration in considering his earning capacity.
The court believes his increased renewed efforts to increase earnings should create no substantial
changes adversely affecting his relationship with the child. These parties have historically been
very successful financially, and that fact helps insure the capability of spending substantial time
with children, if the parents desire that. In this case, the mother has been very reasonable in
dealing with Mr. Arnold and the court could reasonably anticipate that she will continue to insure
more than the normal contact between Mr. Arnold and Alexa. The court has also considered the
possibility of his being required to move elsewhere in reaching the conclusion of voluntary
Memorandum and Order
Arnold vs. Arnold
Case No. 984901956
PflPe? of 4

underemployment.
Mr. Arnold is capable of paying the attorney's fees incurred by Mrs. Arnold, and there
being no merit in his claims, will require that he pay reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred
herein. The claim is for $22,116.74 attorneys fees and costs. However, in reviewing the billings
for attorneys' fees and costs, the court has concluded that the claimed amount is excessive. For
example, the attorney has billed for conferences with associate counsel, even though his rate
charged is for an experienced attorney in this type case. Additionally, there were no substantial
unusual legal questions which arose in the case and other than by Mr. Arnold acting pro-se and
filing an unusual number of pleadings and creating some unusual problems requiring more than a
normal amount of counsel's time and effort, it was not an unusually complex case to prepare and
present in court. This court concludes that a reasonable award for attorney's fees and costs in
this case is $17,700.00 which shall be paid by Mr. Arnold.
The court would allow continuing attorneys fees which might be incurred for
unsuccessful challenges to the findings, conclusions and order which the court directs be
prepared and submitted by Mrs. Arnold's counsel. Such documents will set forth in detail all
facts in support thereof based on the evidence at trial, and reasonable legal conclusions consistent with this memorandum.

DATED this

/ / day of

^-J^^Ccj

20C^T^>

RO'GER S/6UTSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Memorandum and Order
Arnold vs. Arnold
Case No. 984901956

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum and
O r d e r l y first-class mail, postage prepaid to the following parties this / /
day of

_, 20 1 6 :
Alan Arnold
Petitioner
5378 S. 1345 W.
Riverdale, Ut. 84405
C. Richard Henriksen, Jr.
Attorney for Respondent
320 S. 500 E.
Salt Lake City, Ut 84102
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§C. RICHARD HENRIKSEN, JR #1466
j^ENRIKSEN & HENRIKSEN, P.C.
Attorneys for Respondent
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 521-4145
Facsimile: (801) 355-0246

IN AND FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

S U 7 ^trt i$&
ALAN D. ARNOLD,
)
Petitioner,

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S
PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE
OF DIVORCE

)

v.
)

KARA H. ARNOLD,
)
Respondent.:

Civil No. 984901956
Judge Duston

The Petitioner's Petition for Modification of the Decree of Divorce heard before the
Honorable Roger S. Dutson on the 27th day of June, 2006 at 8:30 a.m. The Petitioner,
Alan Arnold, appeared in person pro se. The Respondent, Kara H. Arnold, appeared in
person and was represented by C. Richard Henriksen, Jr. of the firm of Henriksen &
Henriksen P.C. Both parties offered various exhibits, which were received into evidence.
The Petitioner and Respondent testified and were cross examined. The court after hearing
the evidence, reviewing the exhibits, taking the matter under advisement to consider this
matter, made a memorandum and order dated July 11, 2006 and now makes the following
Order Denying Petitioner's Petition to Modify Decree o
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^Findings, Conclusions and Orders:
1.

That the parties were divorced on December 3, 1998.

2.

A mediation agreement was signed September 22, 2003 by both parties

which resolved child support, visitation and other issues. Petitioner refused to stipulate to
an order incorporating the mediation agreement and the Respondent had to bring a motion
to enforce the mediation agreement. The court entered an order adopting and enforcing
the agreement on June 17, 2004.
3.

A Petition for Modification was filed in April of 2005 by the Petitioner. The

Petitioner has claimed that his ex-wife misrepresented the amount of money she was
earning at the time of the 2003 agreement, that his earnings were substantially less than
at the time of the 2003 agreement, and he has "shouldered the major portion of the care..."
according to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines. He asked the court to reduce his child
support obligation, remove the agreement to share the private school tuition, grant him the
income tax deduction for the child, change the existing medical, dental, vision and
orthodontic insurance reimbursement, and that visitation be changed.
4.

The court finds that the Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proof on

all issues contained in his Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce.
5.

The Court finds that the earning capacity of the Petitioner has not changed

from the time of the mediation and in fact the Petitioner has had the opportunity and jobs
to increase his income and is subsequently voluntarily underemployed.
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6.

The evidence from tax returns demonstrated the earning capacity

a"!

Petitioner to be:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

g.
h.
7.

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

$ 8,916.66
$ 9,916.66
$19,999.98
$19,954.16
$19,041.25
$17,060.78
$15,167.91
$ 7,912.26

per month
per month
per month
per month
per month
per month
per month
per month (voluntarily underemployed)

The Court finds that the Petitioner had diverted his earning ability to

unjustifiable non-income producing activities. Financial support of children is a primary
obligation of the parents.
8.

The Court finds that the Respondent has not misrepresented her income at

the time of the mediation and enforced agreement of 2003.
9.

The Court finds that there has not been a substantial material change in

circumstances justifying a modification of the existing orders in this case. The Petitioner
has had no reasonable factual or legal basis to pursue the requested modifications herein.
10.

The Petitioner apparently has the notion that child support guidelines must

always control child support. Child expenses also generally continue to increase as
children reach their teen years, even though the tables do not reflect that fact. This child
will soon be 11 years old.
11.

The Court finds that the Respondent's claimed income of $3,500.00, per
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imonth are inaccurate and are not credible as the Petitioner has acknowledged that such
claims of incomes are contrary to the amount of money shown on bank deposits that the
Petitioner put into his bank, which were $226,132.02 in 2004 and $174,652.33 from April
to July of 2005.
12.

The Court finds that the Petitioner has had employment or opportunity of

employment which would provide him with similar or increased income as set forth in the
Order adopting and enforcing the mediation agreement, and specifically declines to find
that the Petitioner's income has decreased. The Petitioner has chosen recently to return
to school voluntarily reducing his present income. The court has also considered the
possibility of his being required to move elsewhere in reaching the conclusion of voluntary
underemployment.
13.

The court holds that In order to modify a decree there must be shown by a

preponderance of the evidence substantial change in material circumstances that could
not have been reasonably contemplated at the time the decree was entered and that
Petitioner has failed to show in this case that is the circumstance.
14.

The court holds that the Petitioner's increased renewed efforts to increase

earnings should create no substantial changes adversely affecting his relationship with his
child. The parties have historically been very successful financially, and that fact helps
insure the capability of spending substantial time with children.
15.

The court finds that the Petitioner has remained an important part of the
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^parties child's life and should be commended for that. The court also finds that the
Respondent has been very reasonable in dealing with the Petitioner and the court
reasonably anticipates that she will continue to insure more than the normal contact
between the Petitioner and the minor child.
16.

The parties stipulation and as adopted by order of court to enroll and share

expenses of private school tuition. Petitioner has been pleassiwith such agreement until
recently and no change is warranted.
17.

Therefore the Court is not persuaded that any modification is appropriate and

therefore the court holds there is no cause of action on the Petition and denies the
Petitioner's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce.
18.

The Court after reviewing the attorneys fees and costs in this matter believes

that the Petitioner is capable of paying attorney's fees incurred by the Respondent in this
matter and there being no merit in his claims. The court finds that although there were no
substantial unusual legal questions which arose in the case and other than by the
Petitioner acting pro se and filling an unusual number of pleadings and creating some
unusual problems requiring more than a normal amount of counsel's time and effort, it was
not an unusually complex case to prepare and present in court. This court concludes that
a reasonable award for attorney's fees and costs in this case is $17, 700.00, which shall
be paid by the Petitioner.
19.

The court will also allow continuing attorneys fees which might be incurred
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^for unsuccessful challenges to the findings, conclusions and this order upon affidavit of

counsel.
DATED this 3L%ay of

H^u4f/1\
2006.
BY THE COURT:

Thfe Honorable Roger S. Dutson
Second District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

3>

day of August, 2006, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE OF
DIVORCE was mailed, first class, postage pre-paid, to the following:
Alan D. Arnold, pro se
5378 South 1345 West
Riverdale, Utah 84405
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